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NOTES
Tian RnNOVATION OV CHURCH AND SPIEMEM
This paper is intended to present a brief review of the checkered
career of Section 811(c) (1) (C) of the Internal Revenue Code
which provides for the inclusion in the gross estate of the decedent
any transfer made during his lifetime, "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death". At first glance the
statute seems simple enough. A common sense interpretation of
it would be that where it is necessary that the beneficiary survive
the settlor to obtain possession or enjoyment then the transfer should
be included in the gross estate for tax purposes. However, tax
lawyers in zealously seeking "outs" and the Government with equal
zeal in seeking to include transfers which Congress never intended
to include presented many problems to the Courts for solutions.
These solutions were not always meritorious, and twice within the
relatively short period of nineteen years Congress has found it ne-
cessary to adopt resolutions correcting the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of this section. It is hoped that these observations will
help clear up some of the obscurities of the past.
Shukert v. Allen', which was decided in 1927, is deemed to be a
proper starting point for this article. In that case the decedent had
transferred certain notes and bonds in trust with directions to the
trustee that he accumulate the income and pay over to his (the
settlor's) wife and children the accumulated income and principal
some thirty years later. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in holding that the transfer was not one intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment after the settlor's death, said that the trans-
fer was immediate and out and out and left no interest in the de-
cedent and the trust was the same whether he lived or died and that
the interest of the children respectively was vested as soon as the
instrument was executed, even though it might have been divested by
the failure of one to live until termination of the trust.
In 1929 when Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company2 was decided,
the Supreme Court held that the fact that the corpus would have
been distributed at a stipulated period after the settlor's death if he
1. 273 U. S. 545 (1927).
2. 278 U. S. 339 (1929). In a series of trusts the settlor created a life interest
in a designated beneficiary and directed that the corpus be distributed either at
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predeceased the life tenant was not a sufficient basis for the appli-
cation of section 811(c).
May v. Heiner3 , a 1930 case, held that a transfer in trust under
which the income was payable to the transferor's husband for his
life and, after his death, to the transferor during her life, with re-
mainder to her children, was not subject to tax as a transfer intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. In reach-
ing this result, the Court was deciding contra to the holdings of many
of the State Courts in their interpretations of like statutes, and con-
sequently the decision was objected to in many quarters as erroneous.
In McCormick v. Burnet', Morsman v. Commissioners , and Bur-
net v. Northern Trust Company6, the Supreme Court affirmed the
result of May v. Heiner, thereby shocking Congress into speedy ac-
tion, and on March 3, 1931, a Joint Resolution was adopted amend-
ing the section to tax expressly a transfer with reservation of a life
estate to the grantor. Hassett v. Welch7 held that the Joint Resolu-
tion was not retroactive and did not apply to trusts created before
March 3, 1931.
Klein v. United States8 , decided in 1931, held that where the gran-
tor conveyed to his wife by deed a life estate in certain lands, but in
the event that she survived the grantor and in that case only she was to
take the lands in fee simple, the corpus was to be included in the gross
estate because the effect of the deed was that only a life estate was
vested, the remainder being retained by the grantor; and whether
that should ever become vested in the grantee depended upon the
condition precedent that the grantor die during the life of the grantee.
The grantor having died first, his death clearly effected a transmission
of the larger estate to the grantee.
In 1935 the St. Louis Union Trust Company9 cases held that if
3. 281 U. S. 238 (1930). The Court said, "At the death of Mrs. May no in-
terest in the property held under the trust deed passed from her to the living;
title thereto had been definitely fixed by the trust deed. The interest therein
which she possessed immediately prior to her death was obliterated by that
event".
4. 283 U. S. 783 (1931).
5. 283 U. S. 783 (1931).
6. 283 U. S. 782 (1931).
7. 303 U. S. 303 (1938).
8. 283 U. S. 231 (1931).
9. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935), and Becker v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935). In the former the decedent
transferred securities to a trustee who was to pay the income to the decedent's
daughter during her life, with remainder over to others; and if the daughter pre
deceased the grantor, the trust was to terminate. In the latter decedent pro-
vided that if the beneficiary should die before him, then the trust estate was to
revert to him. The trust corpus was not included in the estate of the decedent
in either of the cases.
2
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the remainder interests are vested at the time of the creation of the
trust, subject to divestment in the event the donee predeceases the
donor, the gift is vested and not contingent on the donee's survivor-
ship, and the trust corpus is not to be included in the decedent's
estate. Therefore the technical language of the trust instrument con-
trolled the imposition of the estate tax until the St. Louis Trust
Company cases were repudiated by Helvering v. Hallockl° in 1940,
when the Court refused to recognize a distinction between transfers
with a condition precedent and those with a condition subsequent.
The Court held that if the remainderman had to survive the donor
in order to enjoy his gift, the gift was contingent on the donor's
death and should be included in the decedent's estate. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, said that the "unwitty diver-
sities of the law of property" had no place in a fair and workable
tax system.
The Supreme Court of the United States decided the companion
cases of Commissioner v. Field" and Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.
v. Rothensies12 in 1945. In the first of these cases the settlor had
an express reversionary interest in the event all the beneficiaries
predeceased him, and he also had the right to reduce amounts by
will; it was held that the corpus was includable because it was unde-
termined until decedent's death whether any of the corpus would pass
to the beneficiaries. In the latter case the settlor reserved the right
to appoint by will who would take in the event that the named bene-
ficiaries died without descendants; it was held that the entire corpus
of the trust was to be included because until the settlor's death it
was uncertain whether the property would ultimately pass by power
of appointment or by the trust instrument.
The contingent rights of the settlor were expressly stated in the
Hallock, Field, and Fidelity-Philadelphia cases; however the Treas-
ury thereafter sought to extend the rulings of these cases to trusts
where the reverters arose by operation of law. It was ruled, by regu-
lation' 3 promulgated on May 1, 1946, that a trust is taxable as one
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death if:
(1) Possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can
be obtained only by beneficiaries who must survive the dece-
dent, and
(2) The decedent or his estate possesses a right or interest
10. 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
11. 324 U. S. 113 (1945).
12. 324 U. S. 108 (1945).
13. U. S. TRAs. Rxos. 105, § 81.17.
3
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in the property (whether arising by the express terms of the in-
strument or transfer or otherwise).
The regulation specifically provided that the reservation of a life es-
tate in a pre-1931 trust does not constitute a right or interest in the
property under subdivision (2), but the reserved life estate does
serve to make subdivision (1) applicable. Therefore, if subdivision
(2) is satisfied by the settlor's reservation of any other interest, ex-
press or implied, the trust is taxable. Of course, in a trust made
after 1931 the mere reservation of a life estate makes the trust tax-
able. This regulation also provided relief for those trusts set up in
reliance on the St. Louis Trust Company cases, but it made the Com-
missioner's determination as to whether the trust fitted in under the
Klein case or the St. Louis Trust Company cases conclusive.
The courts split on the question of whether Hallock, Field, and
Fidelity-Philadelphia were to be extended to reverters implied in law.
It was this diversity of decisions that led to the granting of certiorari
in the Church14 and Spiegel1 5 cases.
In the Church case the decedent had established a trust in 1924
reserving the income for life and, on his death, the principal was to
be distributed to his descendants then surviving or in default thereof
to his then living brothers and sisters. At the time of his death the
decedent had five brothers and one sister living and many nephews
and nieces. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the trust was not subject to estate tax because the
reservation of a life estate in a pre-1931 trust was not sufficient to
make the corpus taxable under May v. Heiner, and the possibility of
a resulting trust under New York law, in the event the settlor sur-
vived all the remaindermen, arose only by implication of law and did
not bring the case within the Hallock rule. The Supreme Court, of
its own motion, ordered reargument of this case and the companion
Spiegel case and directed that counsel consider whether the rule of
May v. Heiner should be overruled. When the case came up again
the Court overruled the May case saying: "Since we adhere to
Hallock, the May v. Heiner interpretation of the possession or en-
joyment provisions of section 811(c) can no longer be accepted as
correct". Therefore the reason for overruling May v. Heiner was
said to be the decision in the Hallock case.
In the Spiegel case, Mr. Spiegel, a resident of Illinois, created a
trust with himself and another as trustees to pay the income to his
children or grandchildren so long as Mr. Spiegel lived, and upon
14. 69 Sup. CT. 322 (1949).
15. 69 Sup. CT. 301 (1949).
4
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his death the principal was to be distributed absolutely to his then
living children, the then living descendants of any deceased child to
take the parent's share. At the time of the creation of the trust, the
settlor had three children. At the time of the settlor's death in 1940,
the three children were still living and there were three grandchildren.
No provision was made for the distribution of the corpus and its ac-
cumulated income in the event Mr. Spiegel survived all of his chil-
dren and grandchildren. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that under Illinois law if all the children and grand-
children had pre-deceased the settlor there would have been a re-
verter to the settlor by operation of law, and, therefore, the entire
value of the corpus was to be included. The Supreme Court ordered
reargument of this case and posed several questions to be considered,
among which were the following: (1) Whether the fact that the
settlor was the measuring life of the trust was sufficient to include the
corpus in the estate?16 (2) Whether the principles of the Clifford
case17 were applicable to this case? (3) Whether retention of a mere
possibility of reverter, no matter how remote, is sufficient to bring
the trust into the estate? When the case came up again the majority
answered the last question in the affirmative thereby making it ne-
cessary for federal courts to examine property laws of the States
in order to determine whether or not there is the remotest possibili-
ty of reverter. Consequently the "unwitty diversities of property
law", which had been cast aside in the Hallock case, were picked to
play the leading role in determining whether the estate tax should
be imposed or not.
Mr. Justice Burton vigorously dissented on the grounds that the
majority had neither overruled Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. nor
held Clifford to be applicable and that the taxability of reverters
sbould depend on the settlor's intent. He pointed out that the settlor's
chance of outliving his children and grandchildren was extremely
small, and that the value of the reversionary interest was $4,000 and
because of this small $4,000 string the entire corpus worth $1,140,000
was hauled back into the estate and taxed to the tune of $450,000.
Mr. justice Burton felt that such a remote interest was very strong
indication that there was no intent to reserve an interest.
16. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1949), contra.
17. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). The settlor had set up a
trust with himself as trustee to have control over how much of the income was
to be paid to his wife and also other full powers, such as voting the stock, sell-
ing, etc. The trust was for a term of five years. The Court held that the in-
come was to be taxed as the settlor's because of the short duration and the con-
trol left in the settlor.
5
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The Church and Spiegel decisions caused no little concern among
the tax bar and to say that Congress was as much shocked by the
overruling of May v. Heiner as it was by the decision in the May
case would be an understatement. Lawyers, clients, trustees, banks,
trust companies were deeply alarmed as to whether any trust would
be free from attack and legislative relief was sought. It was not
long in coming.
On October 25, 1949, Congress passed an Act'8 , amending the
Internal Revenue Code, which made some salient changes in 811(c)
and the effect of the Church and Spiegel cases. The Act provides
that if a life interest is retained in a pre-Mlarch 3, 1931 trust, the
trust is not subject to tax if the person dies before January 1, 1950,
and it permits the settlor to release or assign the retained life estate
prior to January 1, 1951, free of gift or estate tax. No provision
is made to take care of those who rely on the period of grace (the
year 1950) and die during that time, and consequently prompt action
in the release or assignment of the life estate is essential. It goes
without saying that there will be hardship cases where the life in-
come is all that the settlor has to support himself.
In granting relief from Spiegel, the Act provides that transfers
made prior to October 8, 1949, will be subjected to estate tax as an
interest intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the settlor's death only if the settlor expressly retained a reversionary
interest having a value immediately before his death in excess of
five per cent of the value of the transferred property. The term
'"reversionary interest" includes the possibility that the property trans-
ferred may return to the settlor, or may be subject to a power of
disposition by him, but it does include the possibility that the in-
come alone may return to him or become subject to a power of dis-
position by him. Inasmuch as the value of the reversionary interest
is to be determined immediately before the death of the decedent a
watchful eye should be kept on an expressly retained interest, which
was insignificant when the trust was created, to make certain that it
does not increase, by reason of beneficiaries dying in the lifetime of
the settlor, to more than five per cent of the trust corpus.
The Act has a retroactive provision permitting claims for refund' 9
to be filed before October 25, 1950, for estates of decedents dying
after February 10, 1939, where the tax was levied because of a re-
verter which arose by operation of law or one expressly retained of
small value. Therefore the statute of limitations or prior court de-
18. PuB. L. No. 378, 81sT CONG., 1sT SEss. (October 25, 1949).
19. Ibid., § 7(c).
6
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cisions will not constitute a bar to the filing of claims for refund
in cases where the Act is applicable. Much litigation is to be ex-
pected in respect to claims for refund in the cases where the Commis-
sioner contended that the tax should be assessed under 811 (c) on two
or more grounds, one of which is now excluded, and where a compro-
mise was reached. No decision is considered as having been rendered
on just what ground the tax was assessed2 0, thus opening these cases
to further controversy.
There is no provision for the tax free release of expressly retained
reverters of more than five per cent of the value of the corpus, and,
evidently, the only method of disposing of it free of the gift tax is
to give it to a charity, and even then it may be subject to attack as
being in contemplation of death; however Allen v. Trust Company of
Georgia2l could be used to rebut that contention.
As to transfers made after October 7, 1949, taxability is based on
the survivorship theory. An interest in the property transferred shall
be includible in the gross estate (whether or not there is a retained in-
terest) if possession or enjoyment of the interest can be obtained by
a beneficiary only if he survives the settlor. Therefore where the
settlor is the measuring life of the trust, the trust will be included
in the gross estate. It is doubtful that a transfer in trust to be paid
to a named beneficiary, his heirs and assigns, upon the settlor's death
would escape taxation, although the beneficiary could assign the in-
terest for value and the assignee would take the property on the
settlor's death whether or not the named beneficiary survived the
settlor. The Commissioner's argument in such a case would probably
be that since the named beneficiary cannot personally enjoy the pro-
perty unless he survives the settlor, those standing in his shoes would
not be able to enjoy the property until the settlor's death, and conse-
quently there is a condition of survivorship.
The new law also provides for the inclusion of the transfer in the
decedent's gross estate if by the express terms of the instrument
of transfer, possession or enjoyment of the property can be obtained
only at the occurrence of (1) the settlor's death, or (2) some other
20. For a complete coverage of the refund provision see Mr. Edmund W.
Pavenstedt's article, CONGRESS DEACTIVATES ANOTHER BO IBsIELL: THE MITI-
GATION oF CHURcH AND SPIEGEL, Vol. 5 No. 3 N. Y. U. Tax Law Rev. 309.
21. 326 U. S. 630 (1946). The decedent had established trusts in 1925 for
his daughter and son and had retained a power to amend with the consent of the
beneficiary. In 1937, after it was decided that reservation of such a power
brought the corpus into the gross estate, the settlor executed an instrument re-
nouncing the power to amend the trust. The Court held that the dominant
motive was to rectify what the decedent thought was a completed gift in the
first place and therefore was not in contemplation of death.
7
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event, which other event did not in fact occur during the settlor's
life. Thus a trust with the income to be accumulated and the principal
and accumulated income be distributed to the beneficiaries at the
end of thirty years or upon the settlor's death, whichever occurred
earlier, would be includible in the decedent's gross estate if the de-
cedent died before the end of the thirty years; however, a trust with
the income to be accumulated and the principal and accumulated income
to be distributed at the end of thirty years would not be included in
the gross estate under Shukert v. Allen, which, apparently, is still
good law with respect to the particular kind of trust involved.
22
It remains to be seen whether or not the Government will seek to
extend the Clifford principle23 so as to include in the gross estate
those trusts over which the settlor retained management and adminis-
trative powers as trustee. Such a course was suggested by the Su-
preme Court when it ordered reargument of the Church and Spiegel,
but the general consensus seems to be that such an interest would
not be sufficient to include the trust under 811 (c), although by tor-
turing the imagination it may be possible to fit it in under the broad
general principles of 811 (a).
A fitting conclusion to this article is that used by Mr. Edmund W.
Pavenstedt24 in his extensive and learned article on this subject:
"The story of transfers intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death is a checkered one. Both ex-
tremes- the unrealistic interpretation concerning reserved life
estates and that relating to an unintentionally 'retained' possi-
bility of reverter by operation of law-resulted from Supreme
Court decisions which were subject to immediate adverse criti-
cism. It is, indeed, one of our great blessings that our system
of government in such cases has provided for another arm, Con-
gress, which can promptly correct doctrinaire interpretations of
a statute -whether the doctrine has its roots in Tory or Liberal
soil- which go far beyond a common sense understanding of
its language. In short, both in 1931 and in 1949, Congress
served as an invaluable brake on the Court."
JOHN J. IRwIN, JR.
22. It may be that the Government will contend that where the trust is for
a term of years far beyond the settlor's life expectancy, an implied condition of
survivorship arises, but it is doubtful that such a contention would be upheld.
23. Taxing to the settlor the income from trusts over which he has retained
extensive powers of control as trustee.
24. Supra footnote 20, p. 360.
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DAMAGES FOR BREAcH ov RESmICTIVE RACIAL COVENANTS
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently allowed a recovery of
damages for breach of a restrictive racial covenant.1 The Missouri
Court was careful to point out that the United States Supreme Court
had not expressly ruled on this question in the precedent-shattering
ease of Shelley v. Kraeiner2 , but whether or not the holding of the
Missouri Court is in accord with the spirit of the decision of S/relley
v. Kraemer is not free from doubt, and it is the purpose of this note
to show why.
As a background to the Shelley case it is suggested that the reader
see Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of
Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Uncon-
stitutional,3 by D. 0. McGovney. The practice prior to the Shelley
case may be summarized by quoting from American Jurisprudence:
"The ordinary remedy that is invoked in actions concerning re-
strictive covenants is the equitable remedy of injunction. An ac-
tion at law for damages for a breach lies in favor of the covenantee
and, according to some authorities, in favor of a subsequent hold-
er of the property entitled to enforce the agreement."4
The Missouri Court appears to be the only court to have had the
question before it since the Shelley case and various law reviews have
disposed of the question in one of two ways, i. e., either by saying
that the Supreme Court did not pass on the matter in the Shelley
case or that it would be inconsistent to allow damages in view of the
prohibition of state action as the term is used in the Shelley case.
The Supreme Court stated through Chief Justice Vinson:
"Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular
pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was de-
fined initially by the terms of a private agreement. State action,
as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment,5 refers to exertions of the state power in all forms.
And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation
of this Court to enforce the constitutional commands. 6 * * * *
1. Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S. W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
2. 334 U. S. 1 (1948), 3 A. L. R. 2d 441.
3. 33 CAL. L. Rnv. 5 (1945).
4. 14 Aid. JuR. 663; also see 3 A. L. R. 2d 474.
5. AmSND. XIV, S 1, U. S. CoNsT.: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States".
6. See note 2, supra, p. 20.
9
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And it would appear beyond question that the power of the
state to create and enforce property interests must be exercised
within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
* * * * It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners
would have been free to occupy the properties in question with-
out restraint."
The Arkansas Law Review reacted to the language of the Supreme
Court by saying:
"The concept of state action as now extended means that every
private contract partakes of 'state action' the moment judicial
aid is invoked to enforce it."
9
The writer for the George Washington Law Review was obviously
conscious of the weight of Chief Justice Vinson's word when he posed
his, as yet unanswered, query:
"If all state court judgments are 'state action' within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment, it may be wondered whether
a union shop agreement is enforceable lest it discriminate against
non-union labor as a class, or whether any contract of hire is
enforceable, lest it discriminate against those who were not hired.
Similarly, one may wonder whether a dealer-producer marketing
agreement, the lease of an apartment, or any executory contract,
could be enforced without an examination by the Court, to de-
termine whether the parties had treated all outside persons with
that scrupulous regard for fairness and equality which the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments demand of those who enjoy the
public trust as state and federal officials." 10
One writer, among others,'1 thinks invocation of any court action
based on a restrictive covenant would be unsuccessful and also states:
"The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the racial restrictive covenant cases may be subjected to vary-
ing interpretations but they are landmarks, admittedly, in legal
and constitutional thinking. It is necessary to reconsider and
revalue all the comments of judges and legal writers bearing
a date prior to May 3, 1948."
- 2
7. Id., p. 22.
8. Id., p. 19.
9. 3 ARK. L. Rtv. 96 (1948).
10. 17 Gto. WAsH. L. REv. 398 (1949).
11. See 48 COL. L. REv. 1241 (1948) and 21 So. CAr,. L. REv. 358 (1948).
12. 1 ALA. L. !tv. 15 (1948)
10
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Another writer asserts:
"The Supreme Court will be reluctant to sanction the giving of
legal effect to any discriminatory agreement, the enforcement
of which would intensify the pressing social problem [of dis-
crimination] ."1-
A well reasoned statement is made in the University of Cincinnati
Law Review as follows:
"These cases [Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes14] failed
to provide a specific answer to the question of whether a state
court can enforce a provision incorporated in many racial cove-
nants providing for liquidated damages for breach of the cove-
nant. It is suggested that such a provision will be held unen-
forceable insofar as state court enforcement of a liquidated
damage provision would be state action, and just as the covenant
itself is unenforceable so surely would be one of its clauses spe-
cifying an alternative remedy. The damage provision is only
an alternative method of attempting to effectuate the discrimina-
tion and has the same fatal defect of the covenant, that is, it has
as its purpose the accomplishment of racial discrimination. For
a state court to enforce it is for the state court to lend its aid
and authority to consummate an otherwise incomplete individual
act of discrimination," 15
The Wisconsin Law Review says:
"It cannot be that Chief Justice Vinson was distinguishing be-
tween the different methods by which the covenants could be
enforced so as to say the courts could enforce them by awarding
damages but could not do so by fine or imprisonment arising
out of an injunction. In the first place Chief justice Vinson is
talking about 'voluntary adherence'. You do not act voluntari-
ly when to act otherwise your property would be diminished by
an execution issued by a court. In the second place, such a dis-
tinguishment would be to make a mockery of the rest of his de-
cision. * * * * Most certainly he did not mean to say that the
covenant could be enforced by the obtaining of damages." 16
In affirming the judgment of a lower court which sustained a de-
murrer to an action seeking to enforce restrictions against occupation
13. 61 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1948).
14. Decided with Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, note 2.
15. 17 U. oF CuN. L. Rrv. 77 (1948), p. 82.
16. 1948 Wis. L. Rmv. 508.
11
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of certain lots by non-Caucasians, the Supreme Court of California
said:
"Counsel for the respective parties have agreed that the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer
* * * * holding that such restrictions cannot be enforced through
court action, is controlling here. Accordingly, we do not reach
the question as to whether any tenable cause of action for relief
or recovery other than specific enforcement of the racial restric-
tions is, or could be stated."'
17
In a Texas case the plaintiff held the land under a deed executed
to him by the owner of the reversion after breach of the condition
in the defendant's chain of title that the land would not be sold to
"persons of Mexican descent" (the defendant was such a person)
and in the event of violation of the covenant "all title to the then
owner and occupant shall be forfeited to the grantor, and upon de-
mand, such property and all improvements thereon shall be sur-
rendered to the seller". Although admitting that he could not main-
tain an action on the covenant in view of the Shelley case, the plain-
tiff contended that he was not precluded from relying upon the cove-
nant as a defense to the defendant's cross-action (presumably to
regain possession of the land) but the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas in affirming judgment for the defendant gave its interpreta-
tion of the holding of the Shelley case in clear language:
"It is as much an enforcement of the covenant to deny to a per-
son a legal right to which he would be entitled except for the
covenant as it would be to expressly command by judicial order
that the terms of the covenant be recognized and carried out.
* * * * Under the decision of the Supreme Court, above referred
to [Shelley v. Kraemer], judicial recognition or enforcement of
the racial covenant involved here by a state court is precluded
by the 'equal protection of the laws' clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."1 8  (Emphasis added.)
Although it is not the writer's purpose to discuss alternative reme-
dies for breach of restrictive racial covenants, there have been recent
discussions of this problem which the reader may find informative.1 9
Of particular interest to members of the bar in the South is a re-
17. Morin v. Crane, 32 Cal, 2d 896, 197 P. 2d 162 (1948).
18. Clifton v. Puente, 218 S. W. 2d 272 (Tex. 1948).
19. See 2 VANDWiRLT L. Rav. 123 (1948); 37 CAL. L. Ray. 493 (1949); 3
A. L. R. 2d 473.
12
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freshing article in the Tennessee Law Review2 dealing with the
practical aspect of the non-enforceability of such restrictive covenants
in a Southern state.
The reluctance of the Missouri Court to extend the holding of
Shelley v. Kraemer beyond the express language of that decision can
be understood if one considers the long established practice of en-
fordng covenants of that type. It should be remembered that the
Supreme Court did not declare such covenants unconstitutional but
merely unenforceable by state action and the importance of that
difference has yet to be fully appreciated, for, as one writer21 ob-
serves, has the Supreme Court held the covenants to be unconstitu-
tional that would have been the "go" signal for Congress to enact
legislation making it a crime to enter into such agreements. How-
ever, it is felt that the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision, as
expressed by its all-inclusive language defining "state action" to be
"exertions of state power in all forms", does not permit an alterna-
tive remedy for breach of such covenants inasmuch as it is difficult
to see how one type of action would be "state action" and the other
not. Heretofore when a state court felt that it would be inequi-
table to enforce such a covenant, because of changed conditions or for
other reasons, it would leave the petitioner to his remedy at law for
damages. But there should be no confusing of this practice with
the holding of the Shelley case because the Supreme Court's deci-
sion resulted from an application of the Fourteenth Amendment
and not from a weighing of the equities. The Texas court seems
to have correctly interpreted the Supreme Court's decision because
any recognition of such a covenant in a proceeding in any state
court will constitute action by the state.
Hoover C. BIANTON.
20. TzNN. L. Rzv. 679 (1949).
21. 11 GA. BAR J. 88 (1948).
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